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Abstract
This paper evaluates the eﬀect of two policy changes on the eﬃciency of
Italian regional governments in the provision of health care services: ﬁrst a
change in the electoral system; second a process of ﬁscal decentralisation.
The electoral system was changed in 1995 and replaced a pure proportional
system by a majoritarian system, fostering the transition of regional gov-
ernments towards a presidential regime. The process of ﬁscal decentralisa-
tion took eﬀect in 1998, when intergovernmental grants earmarked for the
health care sector were replaced by regional taxes. The Italian context oﬀers
a unique source of data to test the predictions of recent theoretical mod-
els that support a positive relationship between government eﬃciency and
the electoral accountability enhanced by institutions such as electoral rules
and ﬁscal decentralisation. The paper provides two main contributions: 1) a
comprehensive analysis of the two main reforms that involved Italian regional
governments and the health care sector during the 1990s; 2) the evaluation of
the impact of the electoral reform in a quasi-experimental setting. The ﬁnal
results provide empirical evidence in line with the ﬁndings of the theoretical
models.
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The main purpose of this paper is to study empirically the relationship
between the electoral accountability of politicians and local government eﬃ-
ciency, using a new data-set from Italian regions. The focus of the paper is
on health services, which in Italy are mainly the responsibility of the regions.
The eﬃciency of their provision at the regional level is measured in two ways,
either by data envelopment analysis, or by stochastic frontier analysis.
The paper takes advantage of a process of decentralisation in Italy that
began after the ﬁnancial and political crises of the early 1990s, which deeply
reformed the structure of regional governments. In 1995, new regional elec-
tions were held under a new electoral law that replaced the previous propor-
tional system by a new system based on majority rule and which also favoured
the establishment of a presidential regime in regional governments. Secondly,
while health care expenditures, along with part of the decision-making pow-
ers, had been delegated to the regional level since the establishment of the
regions, revenues have been characterised by a decentralisation process only
during the 1990s. The most important reform occurred in 1998 when two
new regional taxes replaced a large amount of the intergovernmental grants
that were earmarked for the health care sector. The main intention of both
reforms was to stimulate the accountability of the regional public authorities
in order to increase the eﬃciency of local governments.
The main question that this paper will attempt to answer is whether the
1995 reform of political institutions and the process of ﬁscal decentralisation
produced any eﬀect on the eﬃciency of the health care sector. The empirical
strategy is to treat the 1995 change in the regional political institutions and
the process of ﬁscal decentralisation as exogenous policy variations. Unlike
previous empirical literature [Barankay and Lockwood, 2007, Adam, Delis,
and Kammas, 2008], the impact of the two policy changes is evaluated by
estimating a frontier production function by both a parametric (stochastic
frontier models) and non parametric approach (data envelopment analysis)
thereby testing the robustness of the results with respect to the two ap-
proaches. Both methodologies are applied using a longitudinal dataset that
includes ﬁnancial and health care data disaggregated at the regional level for
the ﬁfteen year period of 1991–2005. The output of the health care sector
will be measured in terms of mortality rates (neonatal and infant), that from
many aspects can be considered the best available measure of output; the
current public health care expenditures will be used as the main measure of
2the inputs; ﬁnally, regional tax revenues earmarked for the health care sector
will be used as a measure of the ﬁscal decentralisation process.
The analysis is focussed mainly on the role played by the 1995 electoral
reform because the relationship between the new electoral system and the
eﬃciency of regional governments is estimated in a quasi-experimental setting
that allows a causal interpretation of this relationship. In particular the
ﬁfteen regions with normal statute have been used as the treated group, and
the six regions with special statute, that were not aﬀected by the reform,
function as the control group. Then the treatment eﬀect is evaluated by
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimator which allows of addressing the
counterfactual question of what would have been the eﬃciency path after
1995 in the group of regions aﬀected by the reform if the new electoral system
had not been introduced.
Although the same quasi-experimental setting can not be used to evaluate
the impact of the ﬁscal decentralisation process, it is very important to take
also this second reform into account because a proper evaluation of the 1995
electoral reform can not be done regardless of the massive changes that the
funding system of the health care sector underwent during those same years.
Moreover, the lack of empirical studies makes the analysis of the relation-
ship between ﬁscal decentralisation and government eﬃciency very important
in itself, especially in the actual Italian political context where the central
government is going to embark on a second process of ﬁscal decentralisation.
The results of the empirical models are very robust with respect to the
diﬀerent methodologies and diﬀerent mortality rates. In particular the esti-
mates show that the electoral reform unambiguously increased the eﬃciency
of the regional governments by around 3%, a signiﬁcant number considering
that we are studying the health sector of a developed country and we are con-
trolling for the impact of technical change and other environmental factors.
As far as the impact of ﬁscal decentralisation is concerned, the empirical ev-
idence suggests a general positive correlation between regional tax revenues
and eﬃciency1. Subsequently, the eﬀect of the 1998 tax reform on eﬃciency
has been estimated between zero and 0.007% in relation to a 1% increase in
regional tax revenues. Therefore, the total increase of eﬃciency due to the
ﬁscal decentralisation reform has been evaluated roughly between zero and
1Our estimates report that a 1% increase in real per capita regional tax revenues
increases eﬃciency by between 0.013% and 0.005%.
312% since real per capita regional tax revenues have risen on average from
33 to 630 euros after the reform. However, is important to note that the
weak robustness of this last result supports the idea that the eﬀectiveness of
the 1998 tax reform might have been seriously undermined by the inﬂuence
wielded by the central government that hindered regional government from
setting an independent tax policy.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical literature that identiﬁes
several channels by which increased ﬁscal decentralisation and electoral ac-
countability can increase the eﬃciency of service delivery. For example, the
principal-agent models of Besley and Case [1995], Bordignon, Cerniglia, and
Revelli [2004], Besley and Smart [2007], and Hindriks and Lockwood [2009],
argue that ﬁscal decentralisation can boost electoral accountability via the
mechanisms of yardstick competition2 and tax competition3, and by reducing
the scope for targeting eﬃcient provision to a bare majority of districts. The
theoretical models that are relevant to the 1995 reforms in Italy are primar-
ily those which compare proportional and majoritarian systems (see Persson
and Tabellini [2000], Chapters 8 and 9). These show that majoritarian sys-
tems can aﬀect electoral accountability by either increasing or decreasing
the probability of rent diversion by politicians, bringing about an uncertain
impact on government eﬃciency. With regard to the form of government,
the theoretical models that compare presidential and parliamentary regimes
(see Persson and Tabellini [2000] Chapter 10) show that presidential regimes
are associated with smaller governments and less waste than parliamentary
regimes. Hence, the positive impact of presidential regimes on government
eﬃciency seems less uncertain.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes brieﬂy
the changes that aﬀected regional political institutions in 1995 and the main
aspects of the ﬁscal decentralisation process that reformed the regional health
2Yardstick competition occurs when voters can compare tax policies and levels of public-
good provision that have been adopted by oﬃcials in other regions with those oﬀered in
their own jurisdiction and then use their ballots as votes on the performance of their
incumbents.
3Tax competition occurs when local governments compete over tax rates in order to
attract more tax-payers to expand their tax base. In the spirit of the Leviathan hypothesis
[Brennan and Buchanan, 1980], tax competition should reduce local government taxing
power, improving voters welfare, only if oﬃcials are rent-seeking. Otherwise, the ‘race to
the bottom’, (reduction of the tax rate) would very likely reduce social welfare due to an
undersupply of public goods.
4care funding system. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, whereas the
empirical models are discussed in Section 4. The data are examined in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 reports the main results, Section 7 the robustness checks,
and Section 8 presents the conclusions.
2. The 1995 electoral reform and the ﬁscal decentralisation process
According to the Italian Constitution, there are ﬁve tiers of government:
metropolitan areas, municipalities, provinces, regions, and the central gov-
ernment. Health care is the most important function of regional governments.
According to 2005 ﬁgures, almost 98% of health care expenditures are allo-
cated at the regional level and they represent more than 50% of total regional
budget expenditures. In this area, central government legislation enacts gen-
eral principles, and regional governments pass laws within this framework.
It is important to note that the Italian regions can be divided into two
diﬀerent groups—six special statute regions4 and ﬁfteen normal statute re-
gions.5 Since their establishment, the special regions have enjoyed a higher
level of legislative autonomy from the central government by virtue of a spe-
cial statute that allows them to make laws in more ﬁelds than the other
ﬁfteen regions, with the exception of the health care sector. As a result, to-
tal budget expenditures, excluding health care, are almost four times higher
than in the other regions (see Figure 1) in real per capita terms. However,
since these additional expenditures are completely ﬁnanced by additional
grants from the central government in shared national taxes, the level of ﬁs-
cal decentralisation is, on average, approximately equal in the two groups of
regions.
In February, 1995, two months before the regional elections, the cen-
tral government introduced a new regional electoral system.6 This reform
completed the renewal that involved the electoral systems of all levels of gov-
ernment.7 The main issue in the parliamentary debate was the proportion
4Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the autonomous province of Trento, the autonomous province
of Bolzano, Aosta Valley in the north, and the two main islands of Sardinia and Sicily in
the south.
5Northern regions: Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia Romagna. Central
regions: Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Abruzzo. Southern regions: Molise, Campania,
Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria.
6Law no. 43/1995.
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Figure 1: Average total budget expenditure without health care expenditure in special
and normal regions, years 1991–2005. Source ISSiRFA-CNR [1982-2008].
of seats to be assigned by a majority method. This indicated a desire to
change the previous simple proportional system to a new system in order to
stimulate electoral accountability of regional politicians following the politi-
cal crisis in the early 1990s that involved all levels of governments.8 Under
the new electoral rules, 20% of the seats in the regional parliaments will
be assigned by the majority method. This was suﬃcient to guarantee the
formation of a government by the winning coalition and to create a bipolar
political space. Moreover, under the new electoral system, the names of the
candidates, who compete for the presidency, appeared for the ﬁrst time on
the ballots as heads of the electoral lists. As a result, beginning in 1995, the
form of regional governments began to evolve towards a presidential regime,
although it was only in 1999 that direct election of the heads of the regional
governments was formally introduced. In special regions, however, the special
statutes did not allow the central government to introduce the new electoral
system by an ordinary law as in the normal regions. As a result, the spe-
tionised the local electoral systems. In 1994, after the referendum of the previous year,
the election of members of the national parliament was held under a new majority system,
which replaced the previous proportional system.
8During those years, the entire political class underwent a change as a result of ‘Tangen-
topoli’, the system of corruption that was uncovered by a nationwide judicial investigation
of political corruption named Mani pulite (Italian for ‘clean hands’). Mani pulite began
in February 1992 and led to the demise of the so-called First Republic, resulting in the
disappearance of the parties that had led the political scene since the post-war period.
6cial regions changed their previous proportional/parliamentary system only
some years after the normal regions, since the required constitutional law was
only passed by the central government in 2001.9 According to the natural
expiration of the regional governments in oﬃce, the ﬁrst regional elections
under the new system were held in 2001 in Sicily, in 2003 in Friuli V.G. and
Trento, in 2004 in Sardinia, and in 2008 in the Aosta Valley (where the new
electoral system was introduced only in 2007). In the autonomous province
of Bolzano, however, the old proportional/parliamentary system is still in
eﬀect.
Figure 2 provides a brief description of the ﬁscal decentralisation process
regarding the funding of the regional health care systems since the beginning
of the 1990s in both groups of regions. First of all, it is important to note that,
in per capita terms, health care expenditure (dashed line) and its funding
sources (grants, regional taxes, and regional health deﬁcit) are very similar
in the special and the normal regions. This is a result of the constitutional
mandate requiring uniformity in the provision of health services across the
national territory that induced the central government to equalise per capita
health expenditures and ﬁnancing across regions. The funding of the regional
health care systems underwent three main reforms during the 1990s (see
Bordignon, Mapelli, and Turati [2002] for a detailed analysis).
In 1993, two health taxes that were previously collected by the central
government were delegated to the regions that were also empowered to raise
their rates to avoid running deﬁcits. Moreover, the way of organising the
supply of health services was also changed, giving more managerial autonomy
to the regions.
In 1998 a substantial portion of the intergovernmental grants earmarked
for the health care sector were replaced by two new regional taxes: ﬁrst,
IRAP10, a value added tax on productive activities that applies to companies,
private and public entities and commercial and non-commercial activities11;
second, a regional, additional, personal income tax (rPIT)12. According to
9Constitutional law no. 2/2001
10Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive (Regional Tax on Productive Activities).
11It is levied on the net value of the production of each region; its standard rate at present
is 3.9% and regional governments can increase or decrease it by up to 1% [Longobardi,
2005].
12At present, its standard tax rate is 0.9% and each regional government can increase
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Figure 2: Structure of the health care funding systems in special and normal regions, years
1990–2005. Source ISSiRFA-CNR [1982-2008].
2005 ﬁgures, IRAP and rPIT accounted for 15% and 3%, respectively, of
total regional revenues, and together ﬁnanced almost 40% of total health
expenditures.
In 2001, the remaining quota of intergovernmental grants was replaced
with revenue-sharing of the value added tax (VAT) and petrol tax, including
an equalising transfer for the poor regions. However, after 2001, the way in
which grants were allocated changed only from an accounting perspective,
because the new mechanism13 was only partially put into practice and then,
after six years, completely abandoned. Finally, the central government forced
regional governments to use their own tax resources to ﬁnance their residual
health care deﬁcit.
As shown in Figure 2, however, intergovernmental grants remained the
main source of funding until the year 2000. In fact, the 1993 reform pro-
duced only a small increase in the level of regional tax revenues, and the
1998 tax reform, given the uncertainty surrounding its economic eﬀects, be-
came eﬀective only after a three-year transitory regime. Moreover, Figure 2
shows clearly that the process of ﬁscal decentralisation aﬀected both group
of regions in a very similar way.
In conclusion, it is important to note that, because of the inﬂuence
wielded by the central government, only slight changes have been introduced
13Law no. 56/2000.
8by regional governments to the standard rates of IRAP and rPIT ﬁxed by the
central government.14 Therefore, most of the diﬀerences in the tax revenues
among regions can be explained by the ‘income gap’ between the north and
the south of the peninsula, rather than by diﬀerences in the ﬁscal polices
adopted by regional governments.15 From some aspects this is good news,
because helps minimise the risk of endogeneity; on the other hand the inﬂu-
ence wielded by the central government is bad news, because it increases the
scepticism about the possibility that the 1998 tax reform might have stim-
ulated electoral accountability of local politicians suﬃciently to aﬀect the
eﬃciency of regional governments in the provision of health care services.
3. Empirical strategy
The main argument that this paper seeks to resolve is whether the 1995
electoral rules and the ﬁscal decentralisation process that reformed the re-
gional health care funding systems have stimulated the electoral accountabil-
ity of local politicians.16 Given the diﬃculty of measuring electoral account-
ability, empirical evidence of this relationship can be inferred by studying
the impact of the 1995 electoral reform and ﬁscal decentralisation on the
eﬃciency of Italy’s regional governments in the provision of health care ser-
vices.17
14In 2003 the center-right government, in order to fulﬁl its programme of cutting the gen-
eral tax burden, banned regional governments from raising IRAP and additional personal
income tax rates. The ban was then removed in 2006 by the new center-left government.
15The average 2005 per capita GDP in the south of the country is around 60% of the
average GDP per head in the rest of the country.
16Electoral accountability is deﬁned in Seabright’s 1996 seminal paper [Seabright, 1996]
in terms of the probability that welfare levels of a given jurisdiction determine the election
of the government. Recently, Lockwood [2006] proposed to characterise this concept more
precisely, either by the degree to which institutions allow the government to divert rents
or by the degree to which institutions allow special interest groups to distort government
decision-making by lobbying.
17Government eﬃciency in the provision of goods and services is usually measured by
the diﬀerence between the actual level of the output and the maximum level of output
achievable, given the inputs employed in the production process. Alternatively, govern-
ment eﬃciency can be measured by the diﬀerence between the actual cost of local services
and the minimum cost attainable, given the actual output and the inputs prices. How-
ever, this second approach has been discarded in this paper in order to avoid the problems
related to the scarce availability of input price data.
9So far, the impact of diﬀerent political institutions and ﬁscal decentral-
isation on government eﬃciency have been studied separately using mainly
cross-sectional data-sets. For example, Persson and Tabellini [2005], using a
cross-section of around 70 countries, provide empirical evidence of the eﬀect
of majoritarian electoral systems and presidential regimes on rent extraction
(measured in terms of perceived corruption by public oﬃcials) and produc-
tivity (measured in terms of labour and total factor productivity) in line with
the theoretical predictions of a positive relationship.
The eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralisation, instead, has been estimated following
a reduced-form approach, where measures of general government performance
(e.g., perceived corruption or indicators of the output and/or quality of the
service in sectors such as health care and education) have been regressed
over measures of ﬁscal decentralisation, such as the the ratio of local public
expenditures over general government expenditures. Most of the empirical
evidence, based on cross-sectional data-sets of a wide range of developed and
developing countries, attests to the positive eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralisation
on government eﬃciency [Fisman and Gatti, 2000, Faguet, 2004] with only
few exceptions (e.g., Treisman [2000]). Recently, however, Barankay and
Lockwood [2007] advocated the need to estimate the eﬀect of decentralisa-
tion in a model that mimics the production function of government activities
by using longitudinal datasets. To support their criticism, they estimated
a model of the education system’s production function by means of panel
data from Swiss cantons between 1982 and 2000. Following the same idea,
but using a diﬀerent methodology, Adam et al. [2008] identiﬁed the eﬀect of
ﬁscal decentralisation following a ‘two-stage approach’ where data envelop-
ment analysis of a panel of 21 OECD countries between 1970 and 2000 was
used to compute country-speciﬁc eﬃciency indices in the ﬁrst stage. In the
second stage, country-speciﬁc eﬃciency indices were regressed on an exten-
sive set of alternative ﬁscal decentralisation measures. Again, their results
supported the evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of decentralisation
on government eﬃciency.
In line with the previous empirical literature, we estimate a reduced-form
relationship since we do not have direct evidence of an increase in electoral
accountability like a reduction in rent diversion or in the inﬂuence of lob-
bies. Unlike previous empirical works, however, the impact of the two policy
changes are evaluated together by estimating a frontier production func-
tion either by data envelopment analysis (DEA hereafter) or by panel data
stochastic frontier models (SFM hereafter), using a longitudinal dataset made
10up of ﬁnancial and health care data disaggregated at the regional level over
the period between 1991 and 2005. To that end, each regional government
will be treated as a decision-making unit that provides health care services
under the behavioural assumption that each of them operates in order to
maximise the output given the inputs (output approach), or alternatively,
that operates in order to minimise the level of inputs given the level of out-
put (input approach). According to these simpliﬁed assumptions, and in line
with the standard production frontier models, regional governments are as-
sumed to produce health care ‘output’ according to the following production
function:
yit = f(xit;)g(zit;)h(sit;)exp(vit + ui) i = 1;2;:::;N and t = 1;2;:::;T:
(1)
where N is the number of regions, T the number of years, yit the output of the
health care sector, xit is an (L 1) vector of inputs, zit is an (M 1) vector
of policy variables, sit is a (P 1) vector of control variables,  is a vector of
technology parameters,  is the vector of policy variables’ coeﬃcients, and ﬁ-
nally  is the vector of control variables’ coeﬃcients. For simplicity, and with
little loss of generality, we assume separability between f(:), which describes
the technology of the health care sector, g(:) and h(:) which, respectively,
represent the way in which the policy changes and environment aﬀect the
output. Since we are considering a ‘stochastic’ frontier production function,
the error term has two components: the idiosyncratic error vit  i:i:d:(0;2
v),
which accounts for the statistical noise in the production function, and the
ineﬃciency error component ui, which is assumed to satisfy the restriction
ui 6 0, and provides a measure of ‘residual’ or ‘unobservable’ eﬃciency that
captures the distance between the actual level of output yit and the frontier
once the inﬂuence of exogenous environmental and policy variables are taken
into account. For this reason ui can be interpreted as the managerial eﬃ-
ciency component that can not be observed directly but only inferred as a
residual. In this case since we are conducting a short term analysis, ui can
be assumed time invariant.
4. The empirical models
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the policy variables (zit)
on eit = yit=f(xit;), corresponding to the Debreu [1951], Farrell [1957] mea-
sure of technical eﬃciency, once both the inﬂuence of managerial eﬃciency
11(ui) and the inﬂuence of other environmental variables (sit) are taken into
account. Given the baseline model in (1), this goal can be achieved follow-
ing two diﬀerent approaches: 1) Data envelopment analysis (DEA)18, where
following a two-stage procedure the eﬀect of the policy variable is evaluated
directly on eﬃciency without imposing any restriction on the shape of the
technology f(:). 2) Panel data stochastic frontier models (SFM)19, where we
estimate the impact of the policy variables in one single stage, but the cor-
rect speciﬁcation of the technology f(.) is crucial in order to interpret point
estimates of  as the impact that the policy variables exert on government
eﬃciency.
By following both approaches, it is possible to test the robustness of
the results with respect to the assumptions behind the two methodologies,
especially the correct speciﬁcation of the production function f(:) in the case
of SFM, and the validity of the two-stage procedure in the case of DEA. If
point estimates are not driven by the particular speciﬁcation of f(:) or by the
two-stage approach, then both methodologies should return the same results.
4.1. Data envelopment analysis
The simplest way to describe the two-stage procedure is to proceed back-
ward.20 In the second stage we estimate the following model, derived directly
from the baseline model (1), assuming for simplicity a Cobb–Douglas func-
tional form for g(:) and h(:), and no restriction on the functional form of the
technology f(:).
18DEA was ﬁrst developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes [1978]; a complete survey
of data envelopment analysis can be found in Ali and Seiford [1993].
19Stochastic frontier models have been developed simultaneously by Aigner, Lovell, and
Schmidt [1977] and Meeusen and van den Broeck [1977]; a complete survey of panel data
models is provided by Kumbhakar and Lovell [2000].
20One of the ﬁrst applications of this procedure was by Timmer [1971] in an attempt to
explain interstate variation in technical eﬃciency in US agriculture. A two-stage approach
has been used also by McCarty and Yaisawarng [1993] to investigate eﬃciency in New
Jersey public school districts. Worthington and Dollery [2002] compare diﬀerent methods
to account for the eﬀect of environmental factors on the eﬃciency of 73 New South Wales
local governments in Australia. Afonso and Aubyn [2006] considered a two-stage approach
in relation to the health production process of OECD countries by regressing eﬃciency
scores on a set of variables such as GDP per head, education level, and health behaviour
(such as obesity and smoking habits). Recently, Adam et al. [2008] have used the same
methodology to estimate the eﬀect of decentralisation on the eﬃciency of the public sector
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out making any assumption about the shape of f(:). In particular, in the




 s:t: xit > X; Y > yit;  > 0; 
0 = 1: (3)
Then, eDEA
it = 1=it will provide an estimate of the distance between yit and
f(xit;) for each region i in the year t. The eDEA
it are numbers constrained
to be between 0 and 1 that correspond to the Debreu [1951], Farrell [1957]
indices of technical eﬃciency where 1 is related to a fully eﬃcient regional
government.
The linear program in (3) is solved by using a pooled approach where only
one production frontier is estimated and each region is compared also with
itself in another year. In this way it is possible to use all the N  T obser-




. As argued by Kneip, Park, and Simar
[1998] this bias produces a small measurement error in the estimated indices
of eﬃciency eDEA
it that vanishes as the number of observations increases.
Taking logs in (2), and taking linear and quadratic time trends to be
among the zitm to account for the technical change, the partial eﬀect of
the policy variables on regional government’s eﬃciency can be be evaluated
estimating the parameters  in (4).
21In the paper both the input and output approach have been used.
22In (3) xit is an (L1) vector of input of region i at time t, X is an (LNT) matrix of
inputs of all regions, Y is a (1NT) vector of outputs of all regions,  is a (NT1) vector
of optimal weights attached to the peers of regions i;  is an (NT1) vector of ones, the
last constraint is important for allowing variable returns to scale.
13log(e
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p logsitp + vit + ui
(4)
The simplest way to disentangle the eﬀect of ui from the stochastic compo-
nent of the model (vit) is to interpret the second stage regression in (4) as a
standard ﬁxed eﬀect panel data model, where ui is replaced with the regional
ﬁxed eﬀect that will capture the unobserved managerial eﬃciency of regional
governments. Given the long panel structure, regional ﬁxed eﬀects can be
treated parametrically, including a set of regional-speciﬁc dummies. Con-
sequently, least square dummy variables (LSDV) is the simplest consistent
estimator equivalent to the within the group estimator.
4.2. Panel data stochastic frontier models
Assume again a Cobb–Douglas functional form for f(:), g(:), and h(:).

















itp  exp(vit + ui) (5)












p logsitp + vit + ui
(6)
The key feature of the panel data SFM approach is the association of the
managerial eﬃciency term (ui) with the unobserved heterogeneity. The sim-
plest way to disentangle the eﬀect of ui from the stochastic component of
23A quadratic trend will also be included among the inputs in order to control for
technical change.
14the model (vit) is, again, to interpret the stochastic frontier model in (6) as
a standard ﬁxed eﬀect panel data model. To that end, the eﬃciency error
component ui is replaced with the regional ﬁxed eﬀect.
As said before, since the number of regions is ﬁxed and the asymptotic
properties are based on the number of years, the unobserved heterogene-
ity across regions can be treated parametrically, including a set of regional-
speciﬁc dummies. The main advantage of doing so is to avoid any assumption
of independence between the unobserved heterogeneity and the other regres-
sors, an assumption that would not be tenable in this context, where the
unobserved heterogeneity is interpreted as a measure of residual ineﬃciency
and can be easily correlated with the inputs. Consequently, least square
dummy variables (LSDV) is the simplest consistent estimator equivalent to
the within the group estimator.24 Finally, point estimates of the parame-
ter vector  will provide an evaluation of the impact of the policy variables
on government eﬃciency if the production function f(:) has been correctly
speciﬁed. In fact, the parameter  captures the partial eﬀect of the policy
variables on the level of output once controlling for the level of the inputs
(i.e., we are following the output approach).25
5. The data
As shown in Table 7 in the Appendix, the variables in the data-set can
be split into four main groups: the output and input variables of the health
system’s ‘production function’, the policy variables to capture the impact of
24In the case of correlation between the input variables and the idiosyncratic error
term, lagged input variables will be used as instrumental variables in the estimation of the
reduced form equations.
25An alternative estimation strategy would be that of assuming a speciﬁc distribution for
the two error component, usually a standard normal distribution for vit and a truncated
normal distribution for ui. The impact of the policy variables, then, can be estimated
through maximum likelihood assuming that the vector z is a speciﬁc component of the
mean of the ineﬃciency error component (see Battese and Coelli [1995] for more details
about this approach). The advantage of this approach is that ui can be time variant, but
the consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator depends on two crucial assumptions:
the independence between the ineﬃciency error term and the inputs, and the correct
speciﬁcation of the distributions of the composite error term. In this paper it has been
preferred not to rely on results based on these two strong assumptions because the focus
is not the measurement of the managerial eﬃciency.
15the policy changes on eﬃciency, and the control (or environmental) variables
to control for the impact of the environment.
5.1. Output measures
The identiﬁcation of the output of the health system is a diﬃcult issue
because it needs to be measured from many angles, such as the increase in
the length of life, improvements in quality of life and the equity of the access
to services. This means that just one indicator may not be an appropriate
measure of output. On the other hand, the composite indicator elaborated
by the World Health Organisation [WHO, 2000] has been criticised on sev-
eral grounds by Hakkinen and Joumard [2007], and in many empirical studies
only life expectancy or mortality indices have been used as outcome variables
[Afonso and Ammar, 2005, Or, 2000]. For example, in the assessment of the
eﬃciency of the health care sectors across 191 countries, Evans, Tandon, Mur-
ray, and Lauer [2000] measured the outcome of health care systems in terms
of disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE), an indicator of healthy life ex-
pectancy that diﬀers from the ‘pure’ life expectancy or mortality indices, in
that it takes into account the quality of life other than its length. Recently,
a report by the Italian government [Bellini, Braga, Rebba, Rodella, and Ven-
drami, 2001] aimed to develop a system of indicators for the evaluation of
the performance of the health care system in diﬀerent dimensions. On the
basis of the action also taken in this direction by other developed countries,
the main conclusion of the report is that an all-inclusive index capable of
measuring the performance of the system alone does not exist, and that the
most suitable indicators are, at the moment, life expectancy26, DALE, and
mortality indices (mainly infant mortality27 and neonatal mortality rates28).
Since DALE disaggregated at the regional level was not available for the
whole period between 1991 and 2005, only neonatal mortality rates, infant
mortality rates, and life expectancy could be taken into account in this study.
In the end it has been decided to measure the output in terms of mortality
26Life expectancy is the average number of years of life remaining at a given age and is
computed separately for men and women.
27Infant mortality is the number of babies who die during the ﬁrst year of life per 10,000
new-borns.
28Neonatal mortality is the rate of new-borns who die during the ﬁrst day of life per
10,000 new-borns. In some cases it is also measured in relation to the ﬁrst 6 or 28 days of
life.
16rates using infant mortality in the main empirical model and neonatal mor-
tality for robustness checks. Figure 3 reports, by special and normal regions,
the average infant mortality rate, and the neonatal mortality rate at one day
after birth.
The choice of mortality rates has been driven by the fact that from many
aspects mortality rates are superior to life expectancy as a proxy for the
output of the health care sector.29 First of all, mortality rates allow of
assessing the health care system’s eﬀectiveness minimising the inﬂuence of
environmental factors.30 In the computation of the mortality rates the event
is attributed to the regional health care system where the death of the baby
occurred, thereby wiping up most of the spill-over eﬀects of other regional
health care systems that typically aﬀect life expectancy that is measured,
instead, on a residential basis. Moreover, mortality rates can capture the
short run changes that occurred in the health care system during the time
span of our analysis better than life expectancy, that instead is believed to
reﬂect changes only in the long run. Finally, mortality rates are not subject
to statistical manipulation as are the data on life expectancy.
5.2. Input measures
As far as the input side is concerned, with regard to data availability, the
real current public health care expenditure for services provided directly has
been used as a measure of labour, and the number of public outpatient clinics
and laboratories per 100,000 inhabitants that provided services directly has
been used as a measure of capital (see Figure 4).31 The choice to exclude
from the inputs the health expenditure in reimbursement and the number
29The empirical evidence obtained using life expectancy as a measure of output (not
shown for brevity in the paper but available on request) is only partially in line with the
results reported in the paper. However, given the lower reliability of life expectancy as
a measure of output this discrepancy does not undermine the robustness of the results
discussed in the paper.
30It is also important to note that most of the variables linked directly to lifestyle, such
as, for example, the consumption of tobacco or the level of pollution, are not available
disaggregated at the regional level for the entire time series dimension. Instead data
about variables that might inﬂuence mortality rates, like the mother’s age at the birth of
her ﬁrst child, the birth rate, and the percentage of caesarean births can be easily collected.
31Although current public expenditure is included among the inputs, either DEA or
SFM will be used to estimate technical eﬃciency because current health expenditure is
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Figure 4: Input variables by special and normal regions, years 1991–2005. Source ISTAT
[2008].
18of private clinics has been determined by the necessity to avoid mixing up
expenditure values and clinics of diﬀerent nature in the speciﬁcation of the
production function f(:). This information, however, will be included in the
empirical models in terms of control variables.
5.3. Policy variables
The relationship between the new electoral system and the eﬃciency of
regional governments can be estimated in a quasi-experimental setting. The
idea is to form the control group with the six special regions whose electoral
system remained unchanged, so that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) es-
timator can be used to assess the magnitude of the ‘treatment eﬀect’ of the
electoral reform. To that end, a discrete variable that takes the value 1 start-
ing from 1995 onwards and its interaction with the treated group dummy will
be included among the policy variables. It is important to note that the 1995
electoral reform can be considered an exogenous policy variation since this
policy change was not an autonomous decision of the regional governments:
the new electoral system was introduced through a central government law.
The degree of ﬁscal decentralisation will be measured in terms of the
real per capita amount of regional tax revenues earmarked for the health
care sector (see Figure 2). Then, to evaluate the impact of the 1998 tax
reform, the interaction term between our measure of ﬁscal decentralisation
and a discrete variable that takes the value 1 starting from 2001 (the year in
which this reform became eﬀective) is included among the policy variables.
The exogeneity of the regional tax revenues earmarked for the health care
sector can be supported by the fact that all the changes in the level of ﬁscal
decentralisation were implemented by central government provisions, and
most of the diﬀerence among the values of per capita regional tax revenues is
due to the unequal distribution of income, rather than to diﬀerent regional
tax rates, as discussed at the end of Section 2. In fact, our measure of ﬁscal
decentralisation mainly captures the eﬀect of the central government policy
aimed at reducing the dependence of regions on intergovernmental grants.
However, a formal test for the exogeneity of the regional tax revenues is
performed, and the null hypothesis of exogeneity is never rejected.
5.4. Control variables
This last set of variables can be split into four groups. First, in order
to take into account all changes that occurred in the funding system of the
19health care sector, the other two sources of ﬁnancing—grants and deﬁcit—
will be also included among the policy variables. In particular, a negative ef-
fect of intergovernmental grants on eﬃciency is expected because, as pointed
out by Rodden [2003], grants might inﬂuence electoral accountability in the
opposite way with respect to regional tax revenues. As far as the impact of a
health care deﬁcit is concerned, it is not clear what its sign should be. How-
ever, in the Italian context, where regional deﬁcits are usually settled by the
central government, the level of deﬁcit can be associated with the intensity
of regional expectations of future bailouts. As pointed out by Bordignon and
Turati [2009], higher bailout expectations are associated with softer budget
constraints, therefore a negative relationship between regional health deﬁcit
and eﬃciency can be expected.
In the second group have been included the variables useful for controlling
for the contribution of the private sector to the health condition of the pop-
ulation such as: household private health expenditure not covered by public
funds; the health expenditure in reimbursement; and ﬁnally the number of
private clinics.
The third group includes more general variables such as: the regional
gross domestic product to control for the standard of living and for diﬀer-
ences in the tax base; the total regional budget expenditures net of health
care expenditure, to take into account the amount of resources employed in
other sectors; the population density that can be used to capture either the
possibility of economies of scale or the possibility of congestion in service
provision; the dependency index, which is the ratio of the population which
is either over 65 or below 14 to the rest of the population, i.e., those between
15 and 64, which is useful for taking into account the demand pressure on
the health care system.
Finally, in order to control for those aspects that might inﬂuence directly
mortality rates, the following variables have been included: the maternal age
at the time of birth of her ﬁrst child, the birth rate, and the percentage of
caesarean births.
6. Analysis of the results
Point estimates for the impact of the 1995 electoral reform and the 1998
ﬁscal reform are summarised in Table 1. The ﬁrst column displays the re-
sults obtained following the two-stage procedure where, in the ﬁrst stage,
20data envelopment analysis is performed following the output approach in or-
der to be compared with the panel data stochastic frontier model approach
whose results are displayed in the last column. A general description of the
control variables included in each regression and the point estimates of their
coeﬃcients are reported in the Appendix.
Table 1: Point estimates of the policy variable eﬀect, output of the health care sector
measured in terms of infant mortality.
Medotology  DEA  SFM 
Dependent variable  Efficiency index  100 - morality rate 
dummy 1995
(1) 2 . 0 6   ( 2 . 2 3 )   - 2 . 8 1   ( 2 . 3 4 )  
treatment effect of 1995 elctoral reform
(1) 2 . 9 8 *   ( 1 . 5 2 )   2 . 7 5 *   ( 1 . 4 6 )  
dummy 2001
(1) - 5 2 . 2 *   ( 2 7 . 2 )   - 2 9 . 8   ( 2 3 . 9 )  
tax revenue earmarked for the health care sector
(2)  0.013***(0.005)  0.008** (0.004) 
tax revenue earmarked for the health care sector X dummy 2001
(2) 0 . 0 0 7 *   ( 0 . 0 4 3 )   0 . 0 0 4   ( 0 . 0 3 7 )  
Quadratic trend  yes  yes 
Control variables  yes  yes 
Observations  315  315 
Number of regions  21  21 
Robust standard errors in brackets ()  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(1) Percentage variation in efficiency. 
(2) Percentage variation in efficiency after 1% change of the regional tax revenue. 
As shown in the ﬁrst two rows of Table 1, point estimates of the treatment
eﬀect of the 1995 electoral reform are very robust with respect to the econo-
metric approach, it is possible to observe an average increase in eﬃciency of
roughly 3% in the ‘treated group’ of normal regions after the introduction
of the new electoral system. The positive eﬀect attributed to the electoral
reform is driven both by the input and the output sides. As shown in the
previous Figure 3 (a) the gap in the level of infant mortality shrank rapidly
between the two groups, and as reported before in Figure 4 (a) health care
expenditure has been growing faster since 1995 in the control group of special
regions.
As shown in the last three rows of Table 1, the relationship between the
regional tax revenues earmarked for the health care sector and eﬃciency is
positive and very robust with respect to the econometric approach, gener-
ally a 1% increase in real per capita regional tax revenues corresponds to
an increase of eﬃciency between 0.013% and 0.008%. The impact of ﬁscal
decentralisation related to the 1998 tax reform, estimated through the inter-
action term between regional tax revenues and the dummy 2001, can instead
21be seen as follows. A 1% increase in real per capita regional tax revenues
increased eﬃciency by 0.007% after 2001, the year in which the 1998 tax
reform became eﬀective. Averaging across regions, real per capita regional
tax revenues have risen by a multiple of 18 after the 1998 tax reform (from 33
to 630 euros as show in Figure 2), so the ﬁnal impact of this decentralisation
reform on eﬃciency can be estimated as approximately equal to 12%.
In conclusion, it is also interesting to note the results obtained for the im-
pact exerted on regional government eﬃciency by the the other two sources
of ﬁnancing. As reported in Table 5 and Table 6 of the Appendix, especially
in the case of the input approach, the estimates show that a 1% increase in
the level of grants is related to a reduction in government eﬃciency between
0.15% and 0.08%; and a 1% increase in the level of the health care deﬁcit
generates a negative impact on government eﬃciency between 0.016% and
0.006% in the group of normal regions.32 The negative relationship observed
between government eﬃciency and the other two sources of ﬁnancing sup-
ports the idea, advocated in many empirical and theoretical works (see, for
example, Oates [1985], Rodden [2003], and Bordignon and Turati [2009]),
that a centralised funding system based on intergovernmental grants and
deﬁcits settled by the central government may not stimulate local govern-
ment eﬃciency because local politicians are induced to exploit the ‘ﬁscal
commons’ represented by the national budget.
7. Robustness checks
7.1. In-depth analysis
The ﬁrst concern is about the robustness of the results with respect to
other mortality rates. In this regard, the conclusions obtained using the
neonatal mortality rate at 1 day, reported in the following Table 2, are in
line with the results discussed above in support of the hypothesis that the
1995 electoral reform exerted a positive impact on the eﬃciency of regional
governments in the delivery of health care services. Instead in relation to
the impact of ﬁscal decentralisation, although the point estimates are still
positive, the standard errors are now larger making our estimations not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero.
32The impact of the health care deﬁcit has been estimated separately for the two group
of regions because this last source of ﬁnancing followed a diﬀerent pattern in the two
groups (see Figure 2).
22Table 2: Point estimates of the policy variable eﬀect, output of the health care sector
measured in terms of neonatal mortality rate at 1 day.
Medotology  DEA  SFM 
Dependent variable  Efficiency index  100 - morality rate 
dummy 1995
(1)  -0.71    (1.97)  -3.51*   (2.04) 
treatment effect of 1995 elctoral reform
(1)  3.87*** (1.21)  3.35*** (1.20) 
dummy 2001
(1) - 2 4 . 6           ( 2 1 . 2 )   - 1 7 . 5           ( 2 1 . 5 )  
tax revenue earmarked for the health sector
(2) 0 . 0 0 9 * *   ( 0 . 0 0 4 )   0 . 0 0 8 * *   ( 0 . 0 0 4 )  
tax revenue earmarked for the health sector X dummy 2001
(2) 0 . 0 3 2       ( 0 . 0 3 4 )   0 . 0 2 2         ( 0 . 0 3 5 )  
Quadratic trend  yes  yes 
Other policy variables  yes  yes 
Control variables  yes  yes 
Observations  315  315 
Number of regions  21  21 
Robust standard errors in brackets ()  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(1) Percentage variation in efficiency. 
(2) Percentage variation in efficiency after 1% change of the regional tax revenue. 
The second concern is the linearity assumption used in the estimation of
the second stage panel data model reported in (4). The linearity assumption
may not be appropriate here because the dependent variable can vary only
between zero and one. A possible solution would be to estimate the following
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where (:) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, so that
the ﬁtted values of the eﬃciency scores will neither exceed 1 nor be less than
0. In this framework, the impact of the policy variables can be consistently
estimated by a pooled Bernoulli quasi-MLE (QMLE) as proposed by Papke
and Wooldridge [2008].33 The coeﬃcients’ point estimates for the two output
33Most of the empirical works (for example, Goudriaan and de Groot [1991], Bjurek,
Kjulin, and Gustafsson [1992], McCarty and Yaisawarng [1993], Lovell, Walters, and Wood
[1993], Borger, Kerstens, Moesen, and Vanneste [1994], Vitalianno [1998], and more re-
cently Afonso and Aubyn [2006]) that use a two-stage approach usually account for the
fractional nature of the dependent variable using a Tobit model in the second-stage re-
gression (one-limit or two-limits). The only case similar to Bernoulli quasi-MLE has been
23Table 3: DEA second stage, summary of the policy variables’ point estimates in case of
non-linear model and input approach, output measured in terms of infant mortality.
Approach  Output  Input 
Model  non linear  linear  non linear 
dummy 1995
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tax revenue earmarked for the health care sector






tax revenue earmarked for the health care sector X dummy 2001






Quadratic trend  yes  yes  yes 
Control variables  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  315  294  294 
Number of regions  21  21  21 
Robust standard errors in brackets ()  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) Percentage variation in efficiency. 
(2) Percentage variation in efficiency after 1% change of the regional tax revenue. 
measures are presented in the ﬁrst column of Tables 3 and 4. The magnitude
as well as the signiﬁcance level of the treatment eﬀect related to the 1995
electoral reform (expressed here in terms of average partial eﬀects) is clearly
in line with those obtained in the case of linear model. The impact of the 1998
ﬁscal reform appears always positive but the level of statistical signiﬁcance
is worse than 10% making our estimates not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Finally, as argued in Section 4, panel data stochastic frontier models and
the two-stage procedure based on DEA provide equivalent ways of estimating
the impact of the policy variables on government eﬃciency given the base-
line empirical model presented in (1). The stability of the point estimates
registered across diﬀerent methodologies corroborates the robustness of the
results with respect to the assumptions behind the two methodologies, i.e.,
the speciﬁcation of the production function in the case of SFM, and the
statistical properties of the eﬃciency indices in the case of DEA. The only
concern may arise in relation to the input approach, alternatively followed
found in Worthington [1999], who uses a second-stage logistic model. Essentially, as sug-
gested by Papke and Wooldridge [2008], the possible choice of a two-limit Tobit model for
the second-stage regression is not suitable in this context because, although our response
variable is bounded from below by zero, there are no observations at zero.
24Table 4: DEA second stage, summary of the policy variables’ point estimates in case of
non-linear model and input approach, output measured in terms of neonatal mortality
rate at 1 day.
Approach  Output  Input 
Model  non linear  linear  non linear 
dummy 1995
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tax revenue earmarked for the health care sector X dummy 2001






Quadratic trend  yes  yes  yes 
Control variables  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  315  294  294 
Number of regions  21  21  21 
Robust standard errors in brackets ()  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(1) Percentage variation in efficiency. 
(2) Percentage variation in efficiency after 1% change of the regional tax revenue. 
in the case of DEA even if not directly comparable with the parametric ap-
proach. As reported the last two columns of Tables 3 and 4, in the case of
the input approach, both reforms exhibit a positive impact but the statistical
signiﬁcance of the results is quite weak, however this could be mainly due to
the smaller number of the observations available for the input approach.
7.2. The fundamental identifying assumption of the treatment eﬀect
In this paper, as a main contribution, the eﬀect of the 1995 electoral
reform on regional government eﬃciency has been estimated in a quasi-
experimental setting using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator. The goal
is to address the counterfactual question of what would have been the eﬃ-
ciency path after 1995 in the group of regions aﬀected by the reform, if the
new electoral system had not been introduced. To that end, the group of
special regions not aﬀected by the reform has been used as the control group.
The fundamental identifying assumption underlying this approach is that, in
the absence of the reform, the path of the input and output variables would
have been the same for the two groups of regions. As shown in Table 7 in
the Appendix, where some general statistics of the data are displayed, the
25two groups are very similar in relation to almost all features of the health
care sector. Some diﬀerences can be registered in the health sector budget
deﬁcit and especially in the total regional budget expenditure without health
expenditure as a result of the larger legislative power of the special regions.
However, looking at Figures 5 and 6, clearly the DEA indices of eﬃciency
were following, on average, the same trend before the the 1995 electoral re-
form independently from the output measures and the approach employed in
the estimation of eﬃciency. The same can be argued in relation to the the
input and output variables previously plotted in Figures 3 and 4.
A formal test for the fundamental identifying assumption of the treat-
ment eﬀect is provided by the absence of signiﬁcant interactions in the pre-
reform period between the groups of regions and the time eﬀects in relation
to regional eﬃciency [Stewart, 2004]. This means that the two groups were
following the same eﬃciency path before the reform. This test has been
performed for the input and output variables and the DEA indices of eﬃ-
ciency by estimating the following model for the pre-reform period 1991–1994:
!it = t + t(tD) + i + it where !it is replaced by the variable of interest,
t is the set of year dummies, D is a dummy for normal regions, i is the
regional ﬁxed eﬀect, it is the idiosyncratic error, and t is the parameter of
interest. Strong evidence in favour of the underlying identifying assumption
of no interactions in the pre-reform period has been obtained by the impos-
sibility of rejecting the following null hypothesis H0 : 91;92;93;94 = 0 in
relation to all the DEA indices of eﬃciency, the inputs, and outputs.34
8. Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the impact of electoral rules
and ﬁscal decentralisation on the eﬃciency of local governments when these
institutions are assumed to stimulate the electoral accountability of local
politicians. This mechanism has been the subject of more theoretical work
than empirical analysis so far. Therefore, as a ﬁrst contribution, this paper
seeks to ﬁll some of the gaps left on the empirical side. It does so by estimat-
ing an empirical model where both electoral rules and ﬁscal decentralisation
can be treated as exogenous policy variations, then their impact on govern-
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Figure 5: DEA average indices of eﬃciency by type of region, output measured in terms
of infant mortality.
ment eﬃciency has been evaluated using both panel data stochastic frontier
models and a two-stage procedure based on data envelopment analysis.
The sequence of events that have aﬀected the Italian regional governments
since the beginning of the 1990s provide a suitable data-set. In 1995, a new
electoral system was introduced at the regional level and, since 1993, an
intense process of ﬁscal decentralisation has been taking place culminating in
1998 in a radical reform of the funding system of the health care sector (which
in Italy is managed by regional governments). The second contribution of
the paper is, therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the main reforms that
involved the Italian regional governments during the last years.
The analysis of the 1995 electoral reform takes advantage of the par-
ticular structure of the Italian regional governments and it has been con-
ducted in a quasi-experimental setting where a minority group of Italian
regions with special statute functioned as a control group since they were
aﬀected by the electoral reform with a diﬀerent timing. Using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimator, it has been possible to conclude that the reform of
regional political institutions fostered electoral accountability suﬃciently to
stimulate government eﬃciency. This result is important because, unlike pre-
vious empirical analysis, the quasi-experimental approach unveiled the posi-
tive causal relationship between political institutions—such as majoritarian
electoral systems and a presidential form of government—and government
eﬃciency predicted in most of the theoretical literature. Although the same
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Figure 6: DEA average indices of eﬃciency by type of region, output measured in terms
of neonatal mortality at 1 day.
1998 ﬁscal reform, it has been possible to report also weak empirical evidence
in favour of a positive relationship between ﬁscal decentralisation and govern-
ment eﬃciency. This result is very important for the actual Italian political
and economic context, since Italy is moving towards a more decentralised
system of government.
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33Table 6: Point estimates of the parameters related to the control variables, output of the
health care sector measured in terms of neonatal mortality at 1 day.
Approach  Output  Input 
Methodology  SFA  DEA  DEA 
Model  linear  linear  non linear  linear  non linear 
Intergovernmental grants  0.005  -0.008  -0.015  -0.156**  -0.102** 
 real euros per capita  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.067)  (0.049) 
Regional health deficit  0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
 real euros per capita  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.004) 
Reg. health deficit X normal regions  -0.000  -0.003  -0.004  -0.016*  -0.014*** 
 real euros per capita  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Budget expenditure without health  -0.178***  -0.198***  -0.111**  -0.068  -0.020 
 real euros per capita  (0.068)  (0.073)  (0.051)  (0.096)  (0.062) 
Budget expend. without health X normal reg.  0.126**  0.107  0.038  0.022  -0.018 
 real euros per capita  (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.047)  (0.092)  (0.062) 
Health expenditure in reimbursement  0.061  0.027  0.040  0.046  0.041 
 real euros per capita  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.033)  (0.102)  (0.064) 
Private outpatient clinics and laboratories  0.006  -0.032**  -0.018*  -0.013  0.015 
 number per 100000 inhabitants  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.059)  (0.035) 
Private household health expenditure  -0.448**  -0.418**  -0.396***  -0.399*  -0.327** 
 real euros per capita  (0.206)  (0.193)  (0.133)  (0.218)  (0.144) 
Regional GDP  -0.120  -0.328**  -0.268***  0.388  0.139 
 real euros per capita  (0.132)  (0.134)  (0.097)  (0.401)  (0.275) 
Mother age (first child)  0.492  0.440  0.254  0.600  0.412 
 years  (0.439)  (0.464)  (0.387)  (0.903)  (0.705) 
Birth rate  0.231**  0.289***  0.228***  0.078  0.031 
 number per 1000 inhabitants  (0.092)  (0.103)  (0.074)  (0.192)  (0.126) 
Caesarean birth rate  0.007  0.033  0.025  -0.141  -0.046 
 number per 1000 inhabitants  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.037)  (0.121)  (0.080) 
Dependecy index  -0.378*  -0.231  -0.159  -0.219  -0.135 
 [pop (0-14)+pop (+65)] / pop (15-65)  (0.194)  (0.224)  (0.151)  (0.617)  (0.379) 
Population density  -0.629*  -0.605*  -0.413*  -0.081  -0.205 
 inhabitants per Km square  (0.359)  (0.355)  (0.240)  (0.702)  (0.441) 
trend  0.088***  0.077***  0.067***  0.042  0.031 
   (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.036)  (0.024) 
trendsq  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001  -0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Observations  315  315  315  294  294 
Number of regions  21  21  21  21  21 
Robust standard errors in brackets ()  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Coefficients estimates report the percentage variation in efficiency after 1% change of the regressors. 
34Table 7: General statistics and variable deﬁnitions.






Infant mortality rate (number of dead children per 10000
new births)
53.17 18.52 46.98 17.58
Neonatal mortality rate at 1 day (number of dead children
per 10000 new births)
15.31 7.07 12.70 6.98
Input variables
Public current expenditure (real euros per capita) 847 159 968 229
Public outpatient clinics and laboratories (number per
100000 inhabitants)
10.43 4.81 14.72 9.7
Policy variables
1995 electoral reform (dummy = 1 from 1995 to 2005)
Regional tax revenues for the health sector (real euros per
capita)
221 297 214 311
Control (or environmental) variables
Intergovernmental grants for the health sector (real euros
per capita)
1027 185 1006 230
Regional health care sector deﬁcit (real euros per capita) 84 114 169 237
Private health expenditure in reimbursement (real euros per
capita)
494 113 438 93
Private outpatient clinics and laboratories (number per
100000 inhabitants)
9.68 5.30 10.82 12.30
Households health expenditure not covered by public funds
(real euros per capita)
393 105 400 116
Total regional budget expenditure without health (real euros
per capita)
1095 686 4563 2750
Regional GDP (real euros per capita) 21188 5472 24100 6446
Maternal age at ﬁrst child (years) 30.21 1.05 30.28 1.10
Birth-rate (new born per 1000 inhabitants) 9.05 1.55 9.82 1.64
Caesarean birth-rate (number per 100 new births) 29.37 8.71 24.14 8.43
Dependency index (percentage of Pop. (0–14) + Pop. above
65 over Pop. (15–64))
49.48 4.04 47.27 3.47
Population density (inhabitants per Km2) 199.38 105.32 98.02 55.97
35